Dr. Vopson's proposed second law of infodynamics mathematically models reality as information, providing empirical evidence for ancient simulation hypotheses that existence stems from universal consciousness.
There’s a reality somewhere. A “physical” universe in which a computer can be created. With enough time, a computer can be created in this “top level” universe that is capable of simulating one universe. Then, assuming computational power and efficiency can be improved, multiple universes can be simulated at one time. You can also achieve better simulation fidelity by slowing down the simulated universe, like 1 second of simulation time taking 1 minute of top level universe time.
If we stop there, the probability that we’re living in a simulated universe instead of the top level universe is already pretty high (or inversely the chance that we’re living in the top level universe is pretty low).
Now, if the computers are powerful enough, the simulated universes can probably have computers in them, and those computers will eventually be able to simulate universes, too. Probably in about the same ratio.
So it’s not simulations ALL the way up, but if those postulates are rational, the chance that any randomly chosen universe in the set of all universes is the top level universe becomes vanishingly small, but non zero.
I think it’s definitely the case that if the top level simulation(s) stop, all the downstream ones would, too.
Now, if the computers are powerful enough, the simulated universes can probably have computers in them, and those computers will eventually be able to simulate universes, too
There’s one minor problem with this step of this idea. Where are those simulated computers running? For example, let’s say I spin up a virtual machine on my computer. Then, inside that machine I spin up a sub-virtual machine. The processing power to run that sub-machine doesn’t just appear out of nowhere. The processing power is still all coming from the top level machine. A bit less efficiently than just running a second VM on the top level machine.
This would be the same for universe simulations. Let’s say Universe A simulates Universe B. Now Universe B tries to simulate universe C. But, in order for Universe B to run that simulation, Universe A actually has to run that simulation. The simulation doesn’t get run for free. If anything, it’s probably less efficient for Universe A to simulate Universe B simulating Universe C. So, Universe A would make better use of resources to just run the Universe C simulation themselves and just let Universe B see the results and think they are the ones running it.
No matter how deep the universes nest, every simulation must be run by the resources of the top level universe. Either directly or at several levels of abstraction. There’s no getting around that. Now, it could be that the top level universe has a lot of resources and can run sub-universes pretty efficiently. But there will never be any more sub-universes than the top level universe can run be itself.
The hypothesis is pretty simple, actually.
There’s a reality somewhere. A “physical” universe in which a computer can be created. With enough time, a computer can be created in this “top level” universe that is capable of simulating one universe. Then, assuming computational power and efficiency can be improved, multiple universes can be simulated at one time. You can also achieve better simulation fidelity by slowing down the simulated universe, like 1 second of simulation time taking 1 minute of top level universe time.
If we stop there, the probability that we’re living in a simulated universe instead of the top level universe is already pretty high (or inversely the chance that we’re living in the top level universe is pretty low).
Now, if the computers are powerful enough, the simulated universes can probably have computers in them, and those computers will eventually be able to simulate universes, too. Probably in about the same ratio.
So it’s not simulations ALL the way up, but if those postulates are rational, the chance that any randomly chosen universe in the set of all universes is the top level universe becomes vanishingly small, but non zero.
I think it’s definitely the case that if the top level simulation(s) stop, all the downstream ones would, too.
There’s one minor problem with this step of this idea. Where are those simulated computers running? For example, let’s say I spin up a virtual machine on my computer. Then, inside that machine I spin up a sub-virtual machine. The processing power to run that sub-machine doesn’t just appear out of nowhere. The processing power is still all coming from the top level machine. A bit less efficiently than just running a second VM on the top level machine.
This would be the same for universe simulations. Let’s say Universe A simulates Universe B. Now Universe B tries to simulate universe C. But, in order for Universe B to run that simulation, Universe A actually has to run that simulation. The simulation doesn’t get run for free. If anything, it’s probably less efficient for Universe A to simulate Universe B simulating Universe C. So, Universe A would make better use of resources to just run the Universe C simulation themselves and just let Universe B see the results and think they are the ones running it.
No matter how deep the universes nest, every simulation must be run by the resources of the top level universe. Either directly or at several levels of abstraction. There’s no getting around that. Now, it could be that the top level universe has a lot of resources and can run sub-universes pretty efficiently. But there will never be any more sub-universes than the top level universe can run be itself.